We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement in settings where the patent of an initial innovator may be infringed by a follow-on innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular "lost pro…t" (LP) and "unjust enrichment" (UE) rules, coupled with a lump-sum transfer between the innovators. We identify conditions under which a linear rule can induce the socially optimal levels of sequential innovation and the optimal allocation of industry output. We also show that, despite its simplicity, the optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all rules that ensure a balanced budget for the industry, and often secures substantially more welfare than either the LP rule or the UE rule.
Introduction
Innovation is a key driver of economic growth and prosperity. To encourage innovation, successful innovators often are awarded patents for their inventions. A patent grants an innovator exclusive rights to her invention for a speci…ed period of time. An extensive literature analyzes optimal patent protection, focusing on issues such as the optimal strength and breadth of patents. 1 An important, but less developed, literature studies …nancial penalties ("damages") for patent infringement. To date, this literature has primarily analyzed the performance of individual damage rules that are employed in practice, including the lost pro…t (LP) rule and the unjust enrichment (UE) rule. 2 In contrast, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal design of patent damage rules under sequential innovation, where an initial innovator's patent may be infringed by a follow-on innovator whose di¤erentiated product, possibly of higher quality, expands market demand.
Sequential innovation is important to consider because it drives progress in many modernday industries. To illustrate, today's smartphones are estimated to embody innovations protected by as many as 250,000 patents that have been developed sequentially (Sparapani, 2015) . 3 The design of damages for patent infringement is particularly subtle in the presence of sequential innovation because, although stringent damage rules can encourage early innovation, they may discourage subsequent innovation, especially when uncertainty prevails about whether follow-on innovations infringe earlier patents. 4 1 Early studies of optimal patent protection include Nordhaus (1969) , Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) , Klemperer (1990) , and Scotchmer (1991) 2 Anton and Yao (2007) examine the performance of the LP rule. Shankerman and Scotchmer (2001) , Choi (2009) , and Henry and Turner (2010) examine the performance of both the LP and the UE rules. (These rules are described below.) Choi and Henry and Turner also analyze the performance of the reasonable royalty damage rule, which is discussed in section 6. 3 It has been observed that modern computing technologies like smart phones "tightly and e¢ciently integrate the engineering of other companies and other earlier inventors, and are enhanced with new functions and features to attract consumer interest and drive demand" (Sparapani, 2015) . Similarly, discoveries regarding gene sequencing are valuable inputs in follow-on scienti…c research and in commercial applications (Sampat and Williams, 2015) . Murray et al. (2016) examine the e¤ects of a¤ording academic researchers expanded access to newly discovered information about genetically engineered (transgenic) mice. The authors report that expanded access increases follow-on discoveries by new researchers and promotes diverse follow-on research methodologies without reducing the rate of innovation. 4 Green and Scotchmer (1995) examine the patent length and division of surplus required to induce e¢cient lump sum monetary payment (m), a fraction (d 1 ) of the amount by which …rm 2's operation reduces …rm 1's pro…t, and a fraction (d 2 ) of …rm 2's pro…t. Thus, linear rules generalize the LP rule and the UE rule, including the former (with d 1 = 1 and m = d 2 = 0) and the latter (with d 2 = 1 and m = d 1 = 0) as special cases. 10 We …nd that although linear rules are relatively simple in nature, an optimally-designed linear rule secures the highest welfare among all balanced damage rules (i.e., rules in which all payments are internal to the industry). The optimality of the linear rule in this sense re ‡ects in part its links to both the (lost) pro…t of the initial innovator and the (realized) pro…t of the follow-on innovator. These links enable an optimally-designed linear rule to secure desired levels of industry pro…t, distribute the pro…t to foster innovation by both …rms, and ensure desired allocations of industry output.
We also show that the optimal linear rule typically di¤ers from both the LP rule and the UE rule. Furthermore, the optimal linear rule often can secure a substantial increase in welfare relative to both the LP rule and the UE rule. In addition, when the maximum feasible level of industry pro…t is su¢ciently large relative to innovation costs, the optimal linear rule can ensure the …rst-best outcome, under which each …rm innovates if and only if its innovation enhances welfare and industry output is allocated between the producers so as to maximize welfare. When the optimal linear rule achieves the …rst-best outcome, it resembles the LP rule more closely than the UE rule (so d 1 > d 2 ) when consumers value the product of the initial innovator relatively highly, while it resembles the UE rule more closely (so d 2 > d 1 ) when consumers value …rm 2's product relatively highly. 11 We also show how the optimal linear rule can limit the distortions in innovation incentives and output allocation when the …rst-best outcome is not attainable. 10 Linear rules also encompass pro…t sharing rules, which require a patent infringer to pay the patent holder a portion of the pro…t the infringer secures in the marketplace. 11 As we demonstrate below, the optimal linear rule serves to shift equilibrium industry output toward the product that consumers value most highly. The linear rule a¤ects the equilibrium allocation of industry output by inducing the …rms to partially internalize each other's pro…t, which in ‡uences their pricing strategies.
3
The welfare-maximizing linear rule is optimal among balanced rules regardless of the strength of protection for …rm 1's patent (i.e., for any given > 0). 12 This …nding suggests that although the appropriate strength and scope of patents can help to foster e¢cient levels of sequential innovation, the design of damages for patent infringement may play a particularly important role in this regard.
The ensuing analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 records equilibrium market outcomes. Section 4 characterizes and explains the key features of the optimal linear rule. Section 5 demonstrates that the welfare-maximizing linear rule is optimal among balanced damage rules. Section 5 also illustrates the (often substantial) welfare gains that the optimal linear rule can secure relative to popular damage rules. Section 6 summarizes our …ndings, considers extensions of our analysis, and suggests directions for further research. Appendix A presents the proofs of all formal conclusions. Appendix B further illustrates the optimal linear rule and the welfare gains it can secure.
The Model
We consider the interaction between two …rms. Firm 1 has the potential to innovate …rst and secure a patent on its product by incurring innovation cost k 1 . Firm 2 has the potential to innovate subsequently by incurring k 2 , but only if …rm 1 has innovated successfully. 13 These innovation costs are the realizations of independent random variables, with continuous and strictly increasing distribution functions F (k 1 ) and G(k 2 ); respectively, on support 0; k i for i = 1; 2. We assume that innovation costs are the only costs the …rms incur. 14 12 It follows that the optimal linear rule also dominates ex ante e¢cient patent licensing, as we demonstrate in section 6. 13 Thus, we follow Chang (1995) in abstracting from stochastic innovation and from the possibility of simultaneous research and development activity by multiple …rms. We extend Chang's work in part by considering product di¤erentiation and uncertainty about the applicability of existing patents. Bessen and Maskin (2009) Green and Scotchmer (1995) 's "idea" approach to modeling innovation, assuming that innovators naturally acquire ideas about new products and an innovator must incur a speci…ed cost to implement the innovation.
4
A mass of Q potential consumers are distributed uniformly on a line segment of length Q.
If …rm 1 innovates, it locates at point 0 on the line segment, and Q = 1 if …rm 1 is the only innovator. If …rm 2 innovates, it locates at point Q = L 1 on the line segment, where L is an exogenous parameter that captures the extent to which …rm 2's innovation expands the market. The product supplied by …rm i delivers value v i to consumers for i = 1; 2. The net utility a consumer derives from traveling distance s to purchase a unit of the product from …rm i at price p i is v i p i s. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the product, and purchases from the supplier that o¤ers the highest nonnegative net utility. This formulation admits both monopoly and duopoly industry structures. The duopoly structure extends the standard Hotelling model by allowing the follow-on innovation of …rm 2 to bene…t consumers not only through (standard) horizontal product di¤erentiation, 15 but also through quality improvement (when v 2 > v 1 ) and market expansion (when L > 1). 16
To capture relevant uncertainty about whether …rm 2's product infringes …rm 1's patent, we let 2 (0; 1 ] denote the probability that, after serving consumers, …rm 2 is ultimately found to have infringed …rm 1's patent. 17 In this event, …rm 2 is obligated to pay …rm 1 the amount D m + d 1 R 1 + d 2 2 , where R 1 is the amount by which …rm 1's pro…t is reduced by …rm 2's operation, 2 is …rm 2's pro…t, and m is a lump sum monetary payment.
The policy instruments, m, d 1 0, and d 2 0, are chosen to maximize expected welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surplus). We will call the damage rule associated with damage payment D the linear rule.
The timing in the model is as follows. First, is determined exogenously. Then d 1 , d 2 , and m are set to maximize expected welfare. Next, …rm 1 privately learns the realization of k 1 and decides whether to innovate. If …rm 1 decides not to innovate, the game ends.
If …rm 1 innovates by incurring cost k 1 , then …rm 2 privately learns the realization of k 2 and decides whether to incur this cost in order to secure the follow-on innovation. If …rm 2 innovates, it subsequently competes against …rm 1 for the patronage of consumers on [ 0; L ].
If …rm 2 chooses not to innovate, then …rm 1 acts as a monopolist and serves consumers on
When both …rms compete in the marketplace, they set their prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively. After consumers have been served, it becomes known whether …rm 2 has infringed …rm 1's patent. If …rm 2 is found to have infringed 1's patent, …rm 2 makes the requisite payment to …rm 1.
We assume throughout the ensuing analysis that consumer valuations of the two products are not too disparate, and are large relative to transportation costs. This assumption helps to ensure that all consumers purchase a unit of the product and that, under duopoly competition, both …rms serve customers in equilibrium. 18 Assumption 1. min fv 1 ; v 2 g > 2 L and j j < L, where v 2 v 1 .
Market Equilibrium
Having identi…ed the key elements of the model, we now characterize equilibrium outcomes. To begin, consider the setting where only …rm 1 innovates and so operates as the monopoly supplier of the product. Because v 1 > 2 under Assumption 1, …rm 1 maximizes its pro…t p 1 min fv 1 p 1 ; 1g by selling one unit to all potential customers at price p 1 = v 1 1.
Firm 1's monopoly pro…t is thus
Now suppose both …rms innovate. Let p i denote the price that …rm i 2 f1; 2g charges for its product. Then the location of the consumer on (0; L) who is indi¤erent between purchasing from …rm 1 and from …rm 2 is l = 1 2 [ L + v 1 v 2 + p 2 p 1 ]. Therefore, the demand functions facing …rms 1 and 2 when they both serve customers and all consumers purchase one unit of a product are, respectively:
In the absence of patent infringement, the pro…ts (not counting innovation costs) of …rms 1 and 2 are, respectively: N 1 = p 1 q 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ) and N 2 = p 2 q 2 (p 2 ; p 1 ).
Firm 2's operation reduces …rm 1's equilibrium pro…t by R 1 = M 1 N 1 . Therefore, because …rm 2 is required to pay D = m + d 1 R 1 + d 2 N 2 to …rm 1 if …rm 2 is found to have infringed …rm 1's patent, the pro…ts of …rm 1 and …rm 2 in the event of infringement (excluding m) are, respectively:
The …rms' ex ante expected pro…ts (not counting innovation costs and m) when they both innovate are, respectively: 
In equilibrium, …rm i 2 f1; 2g chooses p i to maximize e i , taking its rival's price as given. Letting 's denote equilibrium outcomes, standard calculations reveal that equilibrium prices and quantities are as speci…ed in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Suppose all consumers purchase a unit of the product and each …rm supplies a strictly positive level of output. Then, given d 1 and d 2 , equilibrium prices and quantities are, for i; j = 1; 2 (j 6 = i):
where
, and all consumers will indeed purchase a unit of the product in equilibrium if d 1 0 and d 2 0 are su¢ciently small. Additionally, any prices p 1 and p 2 in (6) can be induced by some d 1 and d 2 :
Lemma 1 speci…es how d 1 and d 2 a¤ect equilibrium prices and outputs. The lemma implies that if d 1 = d 2 ; then …rm i will charge a higher price than …rm j in equilibrium (p i > p j ) if consumers value …rm i's product more highly than …rm j's product (i.e., if v i > v j ).
Proposition 1 examines the impact of changes in d 1 and d 2 on equilibrium outcomes, including i , the equilibrium expected pro…t of …rm i 2 f1; 2g. 19
Proposition 1. Following innovation by both …rms: (i) p 1 and p 2 both increase in d 1 and in d 2 ; (ii) p 2 p 1 and q 1 increase in d 1 ; while p 1 p 2 and q 2 increase in d 2 ; (iii)
Proposition 1 re ‡ects the following considerations. As d 1 increases, …rm 2 is penalized a larger portion of …rm 1's lost pro…t ( M 1 N 1 ) if …rm 2 is ultimately found to have infringed …rm 1's patent. Firm 2 recognizes that it can reduce this penalty by competing less aggressively, thereby allowing …rm 1's duopoly pro…t ( N 1 ) to increase. The reduced aggression leads to higher equilibrium prices for both …rms. The increased congruence of the …rms' preferences regarding higher pro…t for …rm 1 results in expanded output for …rm 1, secured by a reduction in …rm 1's price relative to …rm 2's price.
As d 2 increases, …rm 2 forfeits a larger portion of its pro…t ( N 2 ) if it is ultimately found to have infringed …rm 1's patent. Firm 1 recognizes that it can secure a larger expected penalty payment from …rm 2 by competing less aggressively, thereby allowing N 2 to increase.
The reduced aggression leads to higher equilibrium prices for both …rms. The increased congruence of the …rms' preferences regarding higher pro…t for …rm 2 results in expanded 19 i is obtained by substituting p i and q i from equations (6) and (7) into equation (5).
output for …rm 2, secured by a reduction in …rm 2's price relative to …rm 1's price. 20
The increase in …rm 1's equilibrium output (q 1 ) and the corresponding reduction in …rm 2's output (q 2 ) induced by an increase in d 1 increase equilibrium industry pro…t ( 1 + 2 ) when …rm 1's pro…t margin exceeds …rm 2's margin (i.e., when p 1 > p 2 ). Similarly, the increase in q 2 and the reduction in q 1 induced by an increase in d 2 increase when p 2 exceeds p 1 .
Before proceeding to characterize the optimal linear damage rule, it is helpful to consider the policy that maximizes welfare and the policy that maximizes industry pro…t following innovation by both …rms. These policies are characterized in Lemmas 2 and 3, respectively.
Lemma 2 refers to equilibrium welfare in the duopoly setting:
Then, when both …rms innovate, the maximum feasible level of welfare (excluding innovation
, is induced. Equilibrium prices and quantities under (9) are:
Equilibrium industry pro…t is = p 1 L. This pro…t increases as d 1 or d w 2 (d 1 ) increases, and reaches its maximum, w = p w L , at
Lemma 3. The maximum feasible level of industry pro…t when both …rms innovate is
which arises when equilibrium prices are 20 See Anton and Yao (2007) , Choi (2009) , and Henry and Turner (2010) for related observations.
with corresponding equilibrium outputs q 1 2 (0; L) and q 2 = L q 1 . These equilibrium prices and outputs are induced by:
Lemmas 2 and 3 report that the welfare-maximizing duopoly prices typically di¤er from the prices that maximize industry pro…t. (They coincide only when v 1 = v 2 .) Duopoly welfare is maximized when the two …rms charge identical prices. In this event, consumers purchase from the …rm that o¤ers the largest di¤erence between product value and transportation cost, which ensures that welfare is maximized. In contrast, industry pro…t is maximized when the …rm with the most highly-valued product charges a higher price than its competitor. Relative to the identical welfare-maximizing prices, this price structure results in greater extraction of consumer surplus.
Lemmas 2 and 3 also report that the values of d 1 and d 2 that induce welfare-maximizing or pro…t-maximizing duopoly prices decline as increases. Thus, less stringent damages are required to secure key industry outcomes when stronger patent protection prevails.
Characterizing the Optimal Linear Rule
Lemma 2 identi…es the welfare-maximizing allocation of industry output following innovation by both …rms. To characterize the welfare-maximizing damage rule for patent infringement, one must also consider the …rms' innovation incentives. To do so, observe …rst that welfare when only …rm 1 innovates is:
Now let b k i denote the realization of …rm i's innovation cost (k i ) for which the …rm will
Equations (8), (15), and (16) imply that ex ante expected welfare (i.e., the level of welfare that is anticipated before innovation costs are realized) is
To examine …rm 2's innovation incentives, let k w 2 denote the increase in welfare secured by …rm 2's innovation (not counting innovation costs). From equations (8) and (15):
Incremental welfare is maximized when …rm 2 innovates if and only if its innovation cost (k 2 ) does not exceed k w 2 . In the ensuing analysis, k w 2 will denote the increase in welfare secured by …rm 2's innovation when d 2 is set (given d 1 ) to ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of industry output.
To assess whether …rm 1's innovation increases expected welfare, one must account for …rm 2's subsequent innovation activity. Let k w 1 ( b k 2 ) denote the increase in expected welfare secured by …rm 1's innovation, given that …rm 2 innovates if and only if k 2 b k 2 . Formally:
Given …rm 2's innovation activity, incremental welfare is maximized when …rm 1 innovates if and only if its innovation cost (k 1 ) does not exceed k w 1 ( b k 2 ).
These observations imply that the optimal linear rule is the solution to problem [P], which is de…ned to be: M aximize
where W is speci…ed in equation (17), prices and quantities are speci…ed in Lemma 1, and b k i is speci…ed in equation (16) 
and q 2 = 1 2 [ L + ] when both …rms innovate. Observation 1 considers the setting where b k 1 < k 1 , so …rm 1 does not always innovate because its maximum innovation cost is relatively large. The Observation reports that if the penalty for patent infringement cannot include a lump sum payment (so m is constrained to be 0) in this setting, then …rm 1 innovates too seldom relative to the …rst-best outcome. 
Therefore, …rm 1 has ine¢ciently limited incentive to innovate when the penalty for patent infringement does not include a lump sum payment between the …rms.
Although …rm 1's innovation incentive is always ine¢ciently low when m = 0, …rm 2's incentive can be excessive. If …rm 2's innovation does not expand the market (so L = 1), then …rm 2's innovation reduces …rm 1's pro…t in the absence of patent infringement penalties.
Consequently, …rm 2's private bene…t from innovation can exceed the corresponding social
Despite the potential con ‡ict between the social and private incentives for innovation, the optimal linear rule can sometimes fully align these incentives while inducing the welfaremaximizing allocation of industry output. As Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 report, the optimal linear rule secures the …rst-best outcome if innovation costs are su¢ciently small relative to the maximum feasible level of industry pro…t, so inequality (20) holds. 
This inequality is more likely to hold if k 1 and k 2 are small and if v 1 , v 2 , and L are large, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 consider settings where innovations are highly valued, …rm 2's innovation expands the market considerably, and/or innovation costs are low. In such settings, the substantial industry pro…t that is potentially available can be divided between the suppliers to induce them both to always innovate even when damages are structured to induce the …rms to set the same prices and thereby maximize duopoly welfare.
Proposition 2 reports that if v 1 > v 2 , then the initial innovator's lost pro…t receives more weight than the second innovator's pro…t in the optimal linear rule (i.e., d 1 > d 2 ). In contrast, if v 2 > v 1 , then the second innovator's pro…t receives more weight than the …rst innovator's lost pro…t (i.e., d 2 > d 2 ). In this sense, the optimal linear rule resembles the lost pro…t (LP) rule more than the unjust enrichment (UE) rule when the (vertical dimension of) quality of the initial innovation is relatively pronounced. In contrast, the optimal linear rule resembles the UE rule more than the LP rule when the quality of the follow-on innovation is relatively pronounced.
To understand the rationale for this penalty structure, recall from Proposition 1 that following innovation by both …rms, the relative price of …rm 1's product declines and its output increases as d 1 increases, whereas the relative price of …rm 2's product declines and 13 its output increases as d 2 increases. Therefore, the identi…ed penalty structure helps to reduce the relative price of, and thereby shift equilibrium consumption toward, the product that consumers value most highly. Doing so ensures the welfare-maximizing allocation of industry output between the two suppliers. Formally, from equation (2):
If v 1 = v 2 = v; then the maximum level of industry pro…t that can be secured is w = . From expression (14), the optimal linear rule sets d 1 = d 2 = 2 v 3 L 4 [ v L ] to induce the welfare-maximizing prices p 1 = p 2 = p = v L 2 , and m is set to distribute between the two …rms to maximize W . If v 1 6 = v 2 ; then industry pro…t can be increased above w by allowing p 1 and p 2 = v 1 + v 2 p 1 L to diverge in order to ensure = .
Now consider how the optimal linear rule is structured when it cannot secure the …rstbest outcome. Initially, the values of p 1 and b k 2 that maximize expected welfare when p 2 is set to leave the marginal consumer with zero surplus in the duopoly setting are identi…ed (see equations (22) and (23) below), and the values of d 1 and d 2 that induce these prices are determined. m is then set to induce the identi…ed value of b k 2 . (From equation (16),
.) The properties of the optimal balanced rule then depend upon whether the identi…ed rule generates more or less than the maximum feasible industry pro…t, as Proposition 3 indicates. The proposition refers to 2 , which is …rm 2's expected pro…t (not counting innovation costs) at the equilibrium identi…ed in Lemma 3, where duopoly industry pro…t is maximized.
Proposition 3. Suppose inequality (20) does not hold. Also suppose e p 2 = v 1 + v 2 e p 1 L, and e p 1 and e k 2 2 k 2 ; k 2 are the values of p 1 and b k 2 that solve , where e 2 =p 2 q 2 (p 1 ;p 2 ) is …rm 2's equilibrium pro…t.
(ii) If e for the identi…ed e p 1 and e p 2 , then the optimal linear rule is ( d 1 ; d 2 ; m ), where d 1 and d 2 are as speci…ed in equation (14) (so equilibrium prices are p 1 and p 2 , as speci…ed in equation (13)), e k 2 solves equation (23), and m = 1 [ 2 e k 2 ].
Proposition 3 re ‡ects the fundamental trade-o¤ that arises when the optimal linear rule cannot secure the …rst-best outcome. When v 1 6 = v 2 ; setting d 1 and d 2 to induce distinct duopoly prices (p 1 6 = p 2 ) can raise industry pro…t, which can be employed to enhance innovation incentives. However, the distinct prices induce outputs that do not maximize welfare.
Proposition 3 reports that, in e¤ect, p 1 is optimally set to balance these two considerations (where, given p 1 , p 2 ensures that the marginal consumer receives zero surplus) as long as the resulting duopoly industry pro…t ( e ) does not exceed the maximum feasible industry pro…t ( ). 23 When e , pro…t cannot be increased further by altering equilibrium prices, so the maximum industry pro…t constraint binds. The optimal prices maximize industry pro…t in this case (i.e., p 1 = p 1 and p 2 = p 2 ). 24 k w 1 b k 1 > 0 can be viewed as a measure of the extent to which …rm 1 has insu¢cient incentive to innovate.
can be viewed as a measure of the extent to which …rm 2 is expected to have insu¢cient incentive to innovate, where the expectation re ‡ects the probability that …rm 2 will have an opportunity to innovate (because …rm 1 has innovated).
Equation (23) implies that the patent infringement penalty is optimally increased to the point where the marginal reduction in …rm 1's innovation de…ciency is equal to the increase in …rm 2's expected innovation de…ciency, taking into account the rate at which b k 1 declines and b k 2 increases as the penalty increases.
The Optimality of the Linear Rule
We now demonstrate that the optimal linear rule achieves the highest expected welfare among all balanced patent infringement damage rules. A balanced damage rule can specify the prices the …rms set, a transfer payment from …rm 2 to …rm 1 following innovation by both …rms, the probability that …rm 1 innovates, and the probability that …rm 2 innovates, following innovation by …rm 1. 25 By the revelation principle (e.g., Myerson, 1979) , it is without loss of generality to consider truthful direct mechanisms, where …rms are induced to truthfully report their privately-observed innovation costs. 23 Notice that if v 1 = v 2 ; then e p 1 = e p 2 = p w and e = = W , so only equation (23) is relevant. 24 Assumption 1 ensures that all consumers purchase a unit of the product and each …rm serves some customers in both the welfare-maximizing and pro…t-maximizing outcomes. Consequently, Proposition 3 implies that when characterizing the optimal linear rule, there is no loss of generality in focusing on the duopoly equilibrium in which all consumers purchase a unit of the product and both …rms serve some customers.
Let 1 (k 0 1 ) 2 [ 0; 1 ] denote the probability that …rm 1 is required to innovate when it reports its innovation cost to be k 0 1 . Also let 2 (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) 2 [ 0; 1 ] denote the probability that …rm 2 is required to innovate following innovation by …rm 1 when …rm i reports its innovation cost to be k 0 i , for i = 1; 2. p i (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) will denote the corresponding price that …rm i 2 f1; 2g must set and T (k 0 2 ; k 0 2 ) will denote the corresponding payment that …rm 2 must make to …rm 1 when both …rms innovate. p M 1 (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) will denote the corresponding price that …rm 1 must set when it is the sole innovator. Denote this vector of policy instruments by:
In addition, let q z i (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) denote the demand for …rm i's product following innovation by both …rms, given that …rm i 2 f1; 2g sets price p
denote the corresponding pro…t of …rm i (not counting innovation costs).
q M z 1 (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) will denote the demand for …rm 1's product when it is the monopoly supplier and it sets price
will denote …rm 1's corresponding monopoly pro…t (not counting innovation costs).
Total welfare in this setting when innovation costs (k 1 ; k 2 ) are reported truthfully is:
Firm 1's expected payo¤ when its innovation cost is k 1 , it reports this cost to be k 0 1 , and it anticipates that …rm 2 will report its innovation cost truthfully is:
Following report k 0 1 by …rm 1, …rm 2's expected payo¤ when its innovation cost is k 2 and it reports this cost to be k 0 2 is:
The welfare-maximizing damage policy in this setting is the solution to the following problem, denoted [P-Z]:
M aximize
Inequality (26) ensures that …rm 1 truthfully reports its realized innovation cost and secures a nonnegative expected payo¤ by doing so. Inequality (27) ensures the corresponding outcomes for …rm 2, for any cost report by …rm 1.
To characterize the solution to [P-Z], it is helpful to consider problem [P-Z] 0 , which is [P-Z] except that constraints (26) and (27) are replaced by:
B 1 (k 1 j k 1 ) 0 and B 2 (k 2 j k 2 ; k 1 ) 0 .
Observe that if constraints (26) and (27) = v 1 for all k 1 2 [ 0; k 1 ] and k 2 2 [ 0; k 2 ] for which 1 (k 1 ) > 0 and 2 (k 1 ; k 2 ) = 0 at a solution to [P-Z] 0 . Moreover, q z i (k 1 ; k 2 ) = q i (p 1 (k 1 ; k 2 ); p 2 (k 1 ; k 2 )) as speci…ed in equation (2) for i = 1; 2, for all k 1 2 [ 0; k 1 ] and k 2 2 [ 0; k 2 ] for which 1 (k 1 ) > 0 and 2 (k 1 ; k 2 ) > 0 at a solution to [P-Z] 0 .
Lemma 4, which re ‡ects Assumption 1, indicates that full market coverage is induced in both the monopoly and duopoly settings at the solution to [P-Z] 0 .
Lemma 5. At a solution to [P-Z] 0 , there existk 1 2 [ 0; k 1 ] andk 2 2 [ 0; k 2 ] such that:
(i) 1 (k 1 ) = 1 for all k 1 2 [ 0;k 1 ] and 1 (k 1 ) = 0 for all k 1 2 (k 1 ; k 1 ]; (ii) for each k 1 2 [ 0;k 1 ]: 2 (k 1 ; k 2 ) = 1 for all k 2 2 [ 0;k 2 ] and 2 (k 1 ; k 2 ) = 0 for all k 2 2 (k 2 ; k 2 ]; and (iii) p i (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) = p i (k 00 1 ; k 00 2 ) and T (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) = T (k 0 1 ; k 00 2 ) for all k 0 2 ; k 00 2 2 [ 0;k 2 ] for each
Lemma 5 indicates that if innovation is induced, it is induced for the smaller realizations of the …rms' innovation costs. Furthermore, stochastic innovation ( i ( ) 2 (0; 1) ) serves no useful purpose in the present setting. In addition, because the …rms' production costs do not vary with their innovation costs, there is no gain from inducing duopoly prices and output levels (and thus transfer payments, T ( ) ) that vary with reported innovation costs.
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that each …rm e¤ectively faces the simple choice of innovating or not innovating at the identi…ed solution to [P-Z] 0 . The choices are structured so that innovation is pro…table for a …rm if and only if its realized innovation cost is su¢ciently small, i.e., if k i k i . Therefore, the …rms have no incentive to misrepresent their realized innovation costs, so constraints (26) and (27) It follows that expected welfare in the present setting can be written as:
Furthermore, whenk i k i for i = 1; 2:
where T is a constant and i = p i q i (p 1 ; p 2 ) does not vary with k 1 or k 2 , for i 2 f1; 2g.
Because the corresponding industry pro…t is = 1 + T + ( 2 T ) = 1 + T +k 2 , expression (30) can be written as:
Therefore, problem [P-Z] 0 can be written as problem [P-Z] 00 : M aximize
speci…ed in equation (29), the …rms' outputs are speci…ed in expression (2), andk i is speci…ed in expression (31) whenk i k i , for i = 1; 2. Consequently, problem [P-Z] 00 is identical to Problem [P], which ensures the following conclusion holds.
Proposition 4. The optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all balanced damage policies.
Proposition 4 re ‡ects the fact that linear rules can link damage payments to the pro…ts of both …rms and can specify lump-sum transfer payments between the …rms. Consequently, linear rules provide widespread latitude to induce desired allocations of industry output while implementing desired con…gurations of industry pro…t and corresponding innovation incentives.
Before concluding, we illustrate the welfare gains that the optimal linear rule can secure relative to the LP rule and the UE rule. We do so in the following baseline setting, where consumers value the two …rms' products symmetrically, the innovation costs for the two …rms have the same uniform distribution, and …rm 2's innovation increases the size of the market by eighty percent.
Baseline Setting. v 1 = v 2 = 7:5, L = 1:8, = 0:50, and F (k 1 ) and G(k 2 ) are uniform distributions with k i = 0 and k i = 5, for i = 1; 2. Four elements of Table 1 warrant emphasis. First, there are many settings where the optimal linear rule ensures the …rst-best outcome. Second, the optimal linear rule often secures a substantial increase in welfare above the levels generated by the LP and UE rules. This is the case both when the optimal linear rule achieves the …rst-best outcome and when it does not do so. To illustrate, W exceeds max fW U E ; W LP g by more than 21% when v 1 = v 2 = 10, and by more than 17% when v 1 = v 2 = 5. Also observe that W exceeds W LP by more than 48% when v 1 = 7 and v 2 = 8.
Third, the lump-sum payment from …rm 2 to …rm 1 under the optimal linear rule (m ) can be positive, negative, or zero. For the settings in Table 1 where v 1 + v 2 = 15, m is positive (negative) when consumers value …rm 2's (…rm 1's) product relatively highly and is
Fourth, the optimal linear rule does not always resemble the UE rule more than the LP rule (in the sense that d 2 > d 1 ) when the UE rule generates a higher level of welfare than the LP rule. 28 This is the case because d 1 and d 2 a¤ect multiple determinants of welfareboth output allocations and innovation decisions -in nonlinear fashion. Consequently, even though welfare might be higher when, say, d 2 = 1 and d 1 = m = 0 than when d 1 = 1 and d 2 = m = 0, it does not follow that d 2 will exceed d 1 under the optimal linear rule. 27 Observe that when v 1 + v 2 = 15, W is higher in Table 1 when v 1 6 = v 2 than when v 1 = v 2 . Welfare is higher in the presence of asymmetric product valuations here because consumers purchase more of the product they value most highly and less of the product they value less highly. 28 See the fourth row of data in Table 1 where v 1 = 8 and v 2 = 7.
21
Appendix B illustrates how the optimal linear rule and its performance vary as other model parameters ( k 1 ; k 2 ; L, and ) change. The numerical solutions reported in Appendix B indicate, for example, that the relative performance of the optimal linear rule (W =W LP and W =W U E ) tends to increase as L (the extent to which …rm 2's innovation expands the market) increases.
Conclusion
We have introduced and characterized the optimal linear rule for patent infringement damages under sequential innovation. We have demonstrated that this rule often secures substantially higher welfare than common rules like the LP rule and the UE rule. We have also identi…ed conditions under which a linear rule can induce both e¢cient incentives for sequential innovation and the e¢cient allocation of industry output. Moreover, we have shown that the linear rule is optimal among all balanced patent infringement damage rules.
We have emphasized the welfare gains that the optimal linear rule can secure relative to the LP rule and the UE rule. However, the optimal linear rule can also secure substantially higher levels of welfare than other popular damage rules, including the reasonable royalty (RR) rule. Under the RR rule, when …rm 2 is found to have infringed …rm 1's patent, …rm 2 is required to deliver to …rm 1 the royalty payments that …rm 1 would have collected if the two …rms had negotiated a licensing/royalty agreement, knowing that …rm 2's product infringes …rm 1's patent (e.g., Henry and Turner, 2010) . 29 Absent contracting frictions, the …rms would negotiate an agreement that maximizes industry pro…t in this setting. Therefore, under the RR rule, duopoly industry pro…t will be . Furthermore, following …rm 1's innovation, …rm 2 will innovate if and only if the follow-on innovation increases industry pro…t (so k 2 M 1 k R 2 ). Industry pro…t can di¤er from under the optimal linear rule, and k R 2 often di¤ers from the values of k o 2 andk 2 speci…ed in Proposition 3. Therefore, the optimal linear rule often secures a strictly higher level of welfare than the RR rule (and always secures at least as high a level of welfare).
The expanded Hotelling model that we analyzed facilitates the characterization of the optimal linear rule. The optimality of the linear rule and the substantial welfare gains it can secure relative to the LP, UE, and RR rules seem likely to persist more generally. To illustrate, suppose the duopoly demand for the di¤erentiated product of …rm i 2 f1; 2g is q i (p 1 ; p 2 ; L), where L is a parameter that measures the extent to which …rm 2's innovation expands the market (so @q i ( ) @L > 0). In this setting, the values of d 1 and d 2 in the optimal linear rule will continue to induce each …rm to partially internalize its rival's pro…t. Therefore, higher values of d 1 and d 2 will continue to induce higher equilibrium prices and pro…t, and m can be employed to allocate realized pro…t to secure desired innovation incentives. One di¤erence that will arise in this more general setting is that deadweight loss typically will arise when prices diverge from marginal cost. Consequently, although the optimal linear rule is likely to continue to outperform other damage rules (including the LP, UE, and RR rules), it typically will not secure the …rst-best outcome, as it often does in the expanded Hotelling model.
For simplicity, we have considered settings where key parameters are assumed to be known to all parties from the outset of their interaction. More generally, uncertainty about key parameters (e.g., v 1 ; v 2 ; and L) or the ultimate success of innovation activity may prevail when innovation decisions are made. In such settings, the optimal linear rule may not ensure that welfare is maximized ex post. However, it seems likely to continue to secure higher levels of expected welfare than popular damage rules in light of its expanded capacity to in ‡uence aggregate industry pro…t, and to allocate both industry pro…t and industry output between sequential innovators.
The probability of patent infringement, ; was taken to be an exogenous parameter in our model. In practice, this probability can vary with L; v 1 ; and v 2 : The foregoing analysis could readily incorporate this dependence, since our key …ndings hold for any speci…ed value of . More generally, might be an element of a patent protection policy that is chosen optimally, along with d 1 , d 2 , and m. 30 As noted at the outset, the economics literature has devoted considerable attention to the design of patent protection policy. We have shown that for any level of patent protection > 0, the optimal linear rule ensures the …rst-best outcome when innovation costs are not too large. In contrast, common damage rules (e.g., the LP, UE, and RR rules) typically cannot induce the ideal outcome for any level of patent protection. These observations suggest the importance of devoting additional attention to patent infringement damage rules in the optimal design and enforcement of patent policy.
Future research might extend our analysis to allow for more than two …rms, more than two rounds of innovation, and limited innovator wealth. These extensions may limit the circumstances under which e¢cient innovation decisions and e¢cient output allocations can be ensured simultaneously. 31 However, the extensions seem unlikely to alter our …ndings regarding the superiority of an optimally designed linear rule, given its ability to secure desired levels of industry pro…t, distribute the pro…t to foster innovation by multiple …rms, and ensure welfare-maximizing allocations of industry output.
Appendix A
This Appendix presents the proofs of the formal conclusions in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1
From equations (2) -(5), the expected pro…t of …rm 1 and …rm 2 are, respectively
In an equilibrium where all consumers purchase a unit of the product and both …rms sell positive levels of output, the …rst-order conditions for p 1 and p 2 are:
The corresponding second-order conditions are d 1 < 1 and d 2 < 1. Solving (32) and (33) provides the equilibrium prices p 1 and p 2 speci…ed in (6). The equilibrium outputs q 1 and q 2 in (7) then follow from (2).
To ensure p 1 and p 2 are non-negative and …nite when all consumers purchase a unit of the product, it must be the case that [ d 1 + d 2 ] < 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that [ d 1 + d 2 ] 1. Observe that 3 [ d 1 + d 2 ] > 0 because d 1 < 1 and d 2 < 1. Therefore, when [ d 1 + d 2 ] 1, the denominator in (6) is
Consequently, (6) and (34) imply that p 1 < 0 or p 1 = 1, which is a contradiction. If < 0; then
Therefore, (6) and (34) imply that p 2 < 0 or p 2 = 1, which is a contradiction.
From (7):
25 Therefore, q 1 2 (0; L) ; and so q 2 = L q 1 2 (0; L).
Furthermore, from (6),
Observe from (6) that when
because min fv 1 ; v 2 g > 2 L and L > 0, from Assumption 1. By continuity, if d 1 0 and d 2 0 are su¢ciently small, then consumers will continue to secure strictly positive surplus from purchasing a unit of the product.
Finally, consider
, and
It can be veri…ed that if these values of d 1 and d 2 are substituted into the expressions for p 1 and p 2 in (6), the resulting expressions are indeed p 1 and p 2 . Therefore, these values of d 1 and d 2 induce the equilibrium prices speci…ed in (6).
Proof of Proposition 1
The inequalities in (37) hold because [ d 1 + d 2 ] < 1 from Lemma 1. (37) implies that @q 2 @d 1 < 0 and @q 2 @d 2 > 0 because q 2 = L q 1 . From (2):
Therefore @(p 2 p 1 ) @d i s = @q 1 @d i and @(p 1 p 2 ) @d i s = @q 2 @d i .
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Consider the case where d 1 d 2 . Observe that:
j j L 1; from Assumption 1. Therefore, (39) implies:
The inequality in (41) holds because d 1 d 2 by assumption and 1 2
From (6) and (40):
Moreover, @p 2 @d 1 > 0 and @p 1 @d 2 > 0 because @(p 2 p 1 ) @d 1 > 0 and @(p 1 p 2 ) @d 2 > 0 .
From Lemma 1:
Because @q 2 @d 1 < 0 , (35) and (42) imply that if [ 2 ( d 1 + d 2 ) ] L [ d 2 d 1 ], then:
; then p 2 p 1 0 from (35) and @q 1 @d 2 < 0 from (37). Therefore:
The proof for the case where d 1 < d 2 is analogous.
Proof of Lemma 2 Substituting d 1 and d w 2 (d 1 ) into (6) and (7) provides:
Equilibrium industry pro…t is
which increases as d 1 (or d w 2 ) increases. The highest industry pro…t is attained when the marginal consumer has zero surplus which, from (10), occurs when
(43) implies that equilibrium industry pro…t in this case is w = p w L.
Because p i increases with d 1 and d 2 for i 2 f1; 2g (from Proposition 1) and p i ! 1 as d 1 ! 1 2 from (10), there exists a unique d 1 < 1 2 that ensures equilibrium prices are those identical prices that leave the marginal consumer with zero surplus. From (10) and (43), this value of d 1 is determined by:
Finally, from (8), if both …rms innovate, then welfare (not counting innovation costs) is
The maximum feasible value of f W 12 is
because, from (44):
and f W 12
Proof of Lemma 3
(2) and (3) imply that industry pro…t is:
Since v 1 > 2 L and v 2 > 2 L from Assumption 1, is highest when both …rms produce positive output and all consumers purchase a unit of the product. Therefore, from (21) and (45), the value of p 1 that maximizes is determined by:
(21) and (46) imply:
From (2), the corresponding equilibrium outputs are:
These outputs are positive and sum to L. Substituting p 1 and p 2 into (45) and simplifying provides
Substituting p 1 and p 2 into (36) and simplifying provides the values of d 1 and d 2 speci…ed in (14).
Proof of Observation 1.
From (10) and (18), if d 2 = d w 2 (d 1 ), then:
If m = 0; then b k 2 = min 2 ; k 2 from (16). Furthermore, (16), (19), and integration by parts provide:
Proof of Observation 2.
If v 1 = v 2 v and d 1 = d 2 = m = 0; then q 1 = q 2 = L=2 from (10), and b k 2 = 2 = p 2 q 2 from (16). Therefore, from (18):
(50) Furthermore, from (6):
(50) and (51) 
Thus, the identi…ed values of d 1 , d w 2 (d 1 ), and m induce the …rst-best outcome. Finally, since d 1 < 1, it is apparent from (9) that d 2 R d 1 as R 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.
G(k o 2 ) = 1 when k o 2 = k 2 . Therefore, since k o 1 k 1 ; (20) holds if k 1 + k 2 w . From Lemma 2, this inequality holds if:
The conclusions regarding k 1 , k 2 , v 1 , and v 2 are apparent. The conclusion regarding L holds because @( L 2 [ v 1 + v 2 L ]) @L
= v 1 + v 2 2 L > 0, from Assumption 1.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Suppose, to the contrary, there is a policy with d 2 = d w 2 (d 1 ) ;k 1 = k o 1 ; andk 2 = k o 2 : Then, since (20) does not hold:
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) From (21), prices that leave the marginal consumer with zero surplus (and so maximize industry pro…t) are determined by
(2) and (57) imply:
q 1 = v 1 p 1 ; q 2 = L + p 1 v 1 ; and
Becausek 2 = 2 m from (16):
(58) and (59) imply that the optimal policy can be identi…ed by choosing p 1 andk 2 to maximize W . (8) implies @ f W 12 @k 2 = 0. Therefore, from (17), the optimal p 1 andk 2 satisfy:
The last equalities in (60) and (61) re ‡ect (18) and (19).
(60) and (61) imply that if e p 1 and e k 2 solve (22) and (23) with e p 2 = v 1 + v 2 e p 1 L , and if e < ; then the optimal policy is ( e d 1 ; e d 2 ; e m).
(ii) If e > at the values of p 1 andk 2 that solve (22) and (23), then the candidate solution is not feasible because the identi…ed level of industry pro…t exceeds the maximum feasible level. Formally, an omitted maximum industry pro…t constraint ( e ) is violated. Therefore, if e , the optimal prices are those that maximize industry pro…t, as speci…ed in (13). These prices are induced via the values of d i identi…ed in (14). Thus, the optimal policy is d 1 ; d 2 ; m , wherek 2 solves (23). Table B3 illustrates the e¤ects of changing the probability that …rm 2 ultimately will be found to have infringed …rm 1's patent in the baseline setting. As this probability ( ) increases, the optimal values of d 1 and d 2 decline because the increased likelihood of a damage payment implies that desired incentives can be secured with a smaller payment. Observe that the optimal values of d 1 and d 2 in Table B3 exceed 1 when is su¢ciently small. Therefore, a requirement that d 1 1 or d 2 1 (perhaps re ‡ecting limited liability considerations) can preclude the optimal (restricted) linear rule from securing the …rst-best outcome when is small. 
